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Abstract
We study how the adoption of the euro as the common currency in Europe has a¤ected rmsinvestment
rates. Using corporate data from the eleven countries that adopted the euro in January 1999, as well as
from a control sample of ve other European countries, our paper shows that: (i) the euro has increased
investments for rms from countries that previously had weak currencies, (ii) the euro has had a positive
impact on nancially constrained 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nancially unconstrained 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1 Introduction
In this paper we study how the adoption of the euro has a¤ected rmsinvestment rates in Europe. In
January 1, 1999 the Economic and Monetary Union (EMU) entered its nal phase when the euro became
the common currency for eleven European countries. The introduction of the euro was a momentous event
for Europe. On a more mundane level, it provides researchers a rare opportunity to study rm behavior
when something as close to exogenous as possible happens. We build on our previous research that shows
that the euro has signicantly increased corporate valuations for euro-countries that previously had weak
currencies (see Bris, Koskinen, and Nilsson, 2003b). The question addressed in this paper is whether and
how the increase in corporate valuations has led to an increase in rmsinvestment rates.
According to the neoclassical theory of investment (see for example, Jorgenson, 1963; Hall and Jorgen-
son, 1967) a rm invests so that the expected marginal product of investment equals the cost of capital.
Everything else constant, a reduction in the rms cost of capital enlarges the set of protable investment
opportunities and thus increases investments. Similarly, investments increase when the expected cash ows
from those investments increase given the cost of capital. Financing is assumed to be readily available and
there are no information and agency costs. The Q-theory of investment (pioneered by Tobin, 1969; ex-
tended by Hayashi, 1982) is another way of expressing the neoclassical theory. According to the Q-theory,
the market value of the rms capital divided by its replacement cost summarizes a rms investment
opportunities. The ratio, Tobins Q, is a su¢ cient statistic to explain a rms investment behavior. In
empirical work in corporate nance, Tobins Q is typically proxied by the rms market-to-book -ratio.
In our earlier paper we show that Tobins Q for rms in the euro-countries with a history of recent
currency crises increased by 8:7 percent relative to rms in the noneuro countries after the introduction
of the euro. The euro-countries that had stable currencies did not experience a signicant increase in
corporate valuations. The countries that had experienced major currency depreciations are the countries
that were expected to have signicant currency risk premia prior to 1998 and hence higher cost of capital.
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Furthermore, we documented a signicantly higher increase in valuation 15:9 percent for rms coming
from the weak currency countries that had an exposure to intraEuropean currency risks prior to the
introduction of the euro. Firms that were harmed by currency depreciations drive this valuation e¤ect.
For those rms, the increase in Q induced by the common currency is 22:2 percent.
There are two channels through which valuations have increased in the euro area after 1998. Our own
work (Bris et al., 2003b) concludes that value increases among rms in the euro-countries are consistent
with a reduction in the cost of capital. In line with our view, Bartram and Karolyi (2003) show that
the market risk has become lower for euro rms with signicant exports to the euro area. In addition,
Hardouvelis, Malliaropoulos, and Priestley (2004) show that deepening nancial integration in Europe
prior to the introduction of the euro already resulted in lower cost of capital. The second reason why
valuations have increased, keeping the cost of capital constant, is increases in expected cash ows. There is
a vast literature that argues that common currencies have a positive impact on trade within the currency
area and that ultimately the increase in trade leads to higher incomes.1 Whatever the channel is, the euro
1Rose (2000) and Glick and Rose (2002) argue that common currencies have an enormous impact on bilateral trade
ows between countries that share the same currency. Rose and van Wincoop (2001) estimate that the euro would increase
intra-European trade by 50 percent and Frenkel and Rose (2002) further argue that every 1 percent increase in trade would
lead to 1=3 percent increase in income per capita. Thus the introduction of the euro could increase European incomes per
capita between 15 and 20 percent. Recent evidence shows that trade e¤ects of the euro are statistically and economically
signicant, but not as large as the earlier estimates. Micco, Stein, and Ordóñez (2003) estimate that the euro has increased
trade between 4 percent and 16 percent among the euro-countries without any evidence of diverting trade from other countries.
Barr, Breedon, and Miles (2003) obtain a higher estimate, 29 percent, for the increase in trade among the euro-countries,
whereas Bun and Klaassen (2002) nd that the euro has increased trade by 4 percent initially and the estimated increase in
the long-run would be 40 percent. However, even if the estimated trade e¤ects led to signicant increases in national incomes,
corporate prots would not necessarily increase by the same amount, if at all. Friberg (2001) develops a model, where rms
have a larger incentive to price discriminate between di¤erent markets the higher is the variability of the real exchange rate.
The reduction of real exchange rate variability through the introduction of the euro would then lead to further goods market
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has increased rm valuations and hence may have consequently increased corporate investments as well.
There is also another channel through which the euro may have increased corporate investments.
According to the neoclassical theory, there is no di¤erence in cost of capital between funds internal to
the rm and funds raised from the external capital markets. Thus the amount of internal funds available
to the rm should play no role in investment decisions, controlling for investment opportunities. Empirical
research, however, has demonstrated that internal funds available to the rm do matter. Such literature
has typically focused on cross-sectional regressions of investment on measures of cash ows controlling for
investment opportunities. The method to identify an economic relationship between investment and cash
ows has consisted of comparing the coe¢ cient of the cash ow measure for groups of rms with di¤erent
characteristics (Fazzari, Hubbard, and Petersen, 1988; Whited, 1992; Hoshi, Kashyap, and Scharfstein,
1991) or for the same rms in di¤erent subperiods (Gertler and Hubbard, 1988; Kashyap, Lamont, and
Stein, 1994). The basic result from all these studies is that internal cash has a positive impact on rms
investments when rms do not have easy access to other sources of capital.2
Therefore, the euro may have a¤ected rm investments through changes in nancial constraints that
rms face. Guiso, Jappelli, Padula, and Pagano (2004) argue that European nancial integration has im-
proved some rmsand countriesaccess to nancing. The euro through the creation of a more integrated
nancial market can relax nancing constraints in two ways: rms have now easier access to nancial
markets in other European markets that can be more developed than their domestic nancial market, and
integration and lower prots for rms, perhaps o¤setting the e¤ects from increased trade.
2Alternatively, several papers have analyzed the relationship between cash ow and investment by identifying an exogenous
shock to cash ows, and comparing the change in investments for di¤erent rms as a reaction to the shock. In particular,
Blanchard, López de Silanes, and Shleifer (1994) show that rms that receive cash windfalls tend to invest in negative NPV
projects, particularly acquisitions. Lamont (1997) analyzes the investment response of oil companies to a drop in oil prices,
and shows that rms reduce investments in both their oil and non-oil segments.
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regulatory harmonization and competitive pressures can lead to more developed domestic nancial mar-
kets. One indication of improved nancial development in Europe is the large increase in corporate bond
issues for rms from euro-countries (see Rajan and Zingales, 2003; Pagano and von Thadden, 2004). Before
the introduction of the euro even the largest European companies were dependent on bank nancing. Now
there is a viable alternative to that and hence potential hold-up problems associated with bank nancing
should be less severe. If the introduction of the euro has improved access to nancing, then the empirical
implication is that those rms that were previously more nancially constrained should experience the
largest increase in investments after controlling for investment opportunities.
In this paper our objective is to study if rms in the euro-area have increased investments compared
to rms coming from other European countries and if investments have increased, have they increased in
line with the increases in valuations. The core of our empirical analysis consists of estimating investment
regressions using the standard controls measures of protability, leverage, size with Tobins Q, and
time dummies for rms in the euro area for the time the common currency has been in use. Because
Tobins Q is endogenous, we instrument Q using past variability in Q values and past levels of interest
rates as instruments with the euro-time dummies used as explanatory variables for Q. If Q is a su¢ cient
statistic for investments, the coe¢ cients on the euro-time dummies should be signicant only in the Q
regression. If in addition the euro has a¤ected rmsnancial constraints, the euro-time dummies should
also explain investments directly in the second stage regression. The reason is that although Q is a
function of nancial constraints as well, the relaxation of nancial constraints should have a direct e¤ect
on investments, irrespective of Q.
Our sample consists of 1; 401 rms from 16 European countries in the period 1994-2002. In particular,
we use corporate-level data from eleven countries that adopted the euro. We exclude Greece because it
adopted the euro in January 1, 2001 and therefore it would be di¢ cult to classify in our sample. As
our control sample we use the three EU countries that did not adopt the euro Denmark, Sweden, and
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the U.K. as well as Norway and Switzerland. Using a control sample allows us to compute di¤erences-
in-di¤erences estimators to measure the impact of the euro both cross-sectionally and in the time-series
domain. We measure investments as total investments during a year divided by the beginning of the period
book value of non-cash assets.
We show that the introduction of the euro has had a positive indirect e¤ect on investments through the
increase in Q but that e¤ect is o¤set by the euros negative direct e¤ect on investments. However, when
we split the sample of euro rms between rms in weak-euro countries countries that su¤ered a currency
crisis in the years before the introduction of the euro  and strong-euro countries, we nd that for the
weak euro-countries investments increase by 2:2 percent indirectly through the increase in Q and that the
euro has no direct e¤ect on investments. For the strong-euro countries, the situation is the opposite: no
signicant indirect e¤ect through increase in Q but investments decrease by 1:4   1:7 percent because of
the direct negative e¤ect the euro has on investments. We further show that the increases in investments
 through the indirect mechanism of increases in Q are larger for rms whose stock prices tended to
decline when their domestic currency depreciated against the euro.
To summarize, we nd that rms from the weak-euro countries have experienced increases in invest-
ments corresponding to increases in Q. However, some rms from strong euro-countries especially small,
domestic companies  have experienced a decrease in their investment rates that is not captured by a
decrease in Q. To examine this issue further we divide the rms in our sample into nancially constrained
and nancially unconstrained rms. We show that while all rms in weak-euro countries invest more,
the increase in investments is larger for nancially unconstrained rms. This is due to the high indirect
e¤ect on investments of an increase in Q for those rms. However, constrained rms increase investments
more than the increase in their Q would suggest. Hence the euro also has a signicant direct e¤ect on
investments for nancially constrained rms. This is evidence that nancial constraints have been relaxed
in countries that previously had weak currencies.
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For the strong countries the situation is more complex. There is no indirect or direct euro e¤ect for
the constrained rms in strong-euro countries. However, when these rms issue bonds, they experience
both an indirect and direct increase in investments. This is evidence that the euro has increased access to
nancing in strong-euro countries as well. For nancially unconstrained rms in the strong-euro area, we
document a signicant negative direct e¤ect on investments without a corresponding decrease in Q. The
most plausible explanation for this is that rms in strong-euro countries operating in domestic markets (non-
manufacturing rms) are restructuring cutting capacity for example and hence decreasing investments.
The nancial markets do not mind this at all so there is no preceding decline in Q. We nd support for
this last argument when we estimate the Q and investments regressions industry by industry. Finally,
the negative consequences of the euro on investments for the strong countries disappear after France and
Germany are dropped out from the sample.
Our paper proceeds as follows. Section 2 describes our data sources and the main variables used
throughout the paper. Section 3 describes our main result. In section 4 we extend the results by classifying
rms according to the strength of their legacy currency, exchange rate exposure, and rm size. In section
5 we examine the role of nancial constraints. In section 6 we provide some robustness tests, and section
7 concludes.
2 Description of data
2.1 Sample selection and data sources
In order to investigate the e¤ects of the euro on corporate investments we collect rm-level data from all
countries that adopted the euro (except Greece) as well as from ve Western European countries that did
not adopt the euro (Denmark, Sweden, the U.K., Norway, and Switzerland). The latter ve countries are
either part of the EU (Denmark, Sweden, and the UK) or have bilateral agreements with the EU (Norway
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and Switzerland) that give them more or less full access to the internal market of the EU. Thus, by using
this group of countries as a benchmark we are likely to keep e¤ects from general market integration in
Europe xed across rms over time, and enables us to better isolate the e¤ects of the euro on corporate
investments. The sample of rms is drawn from Worldscope and covers the time period 1995-2002. We
exclude Greece, as Greece did not adopt the euro until January 2001 and it is hard to classify it as either
a euro-area or a non-euro-area country in the time period from the introduction of the euro until they
actually adopted the common currency.
For our 16 sample countries we include all rms that have complete data on our investment measure
and main control variables for the whole time period of 1995-2002. We impose this requirement because
we want to analyze withinrm changes following the introduction of the euro and thus need rms to exist
both before and after the introduction of the euro.
Our nal sample consists of 1; 401 rms (11; 208 observations): 713 rms (5; 704 observations) from
the euro-countries and 688 rms (5; 504 observations) from the noneuro countries. Our sample of rms
includes public rms only. Therefore our results below do not necessarily apply to privately held rms.3
All rm-level data in this study are from Worldscope unless otherwise stated. All macro variables that
we employ as control variables in our analyses are from OECDs statistical databases, except for the U.S.
dollar exchange rates, which are gathered from EcoWin.
We use the o¢ cial adoption of the euro in year 1999 as the benchmark year for post-euro time. Bris,
Koskinen and Nilsson (2003b) use the year 1998 as the benchmark year for adoption of the euro because
that paper focuses on the valuation e¤ects of the new common currency and valuation measures based on
market values are forward looking. Arguably, real variables like investments react more slowly to exogenous
shocks than stock prices do. In Section 6.6.1 we check the robustness of our assumption.
3 It is possible that the e¤ects of the euro, through its impact on capital markets, has been more signicant in public
companies, in which case our paper overstates the true e¤ects of the common currency on the entire corporate sector.
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[Insert Table 1: Sample Description]
Table 1 summarizes the characteristics of the sample.4 The average rm in our sample has sales of
C2.2 billion, of which 13:6 percent are foreign sales. Average rm Q measured by the market-to-book
ratio is 1:5 (1:4 in euro-countries, 1:6 in non-euro countries). The average rm in the euro area is larger
than the average rm in the non-euro area (although the di¤erence is not statistically signicant). Table
1 also reports average exchange rate betas whose calculation is described in Appendix C. Because rms
with foreign assets have positive exchange rate betas, our initial results show that the average euro rm
is more likely to be a net exporter to other euro countries, while the average non-euro rm is likely to be
a net importer with respect to euro countries or else receives nancing in euros. Over the entire sample
period, short-term interest rates and term spreads are not statistically di¤erent in two areas (short-term
interest rate is 4:8 percent and the term-spread is 1:4 percent on average for the whole sample). However
euro-countries grow more (3:6 percent GDP growth) than non-euro countries (2:9 percent GDP growth on
average).
2.2 Corporate investment measure
As a measure of corporate investment, we use the total corporate investments during the year, divided
by the beginning-of-period book value of non-cash assets. Corporate investments include: Net Assets
from Acquisitions (Worldscope item #04355), Capital Expenditures (Worldscope item #04601), Addition
to Other Assets (Worldscope item #04651), and Research and Development (Worldscope item #01201).
Not-cash Assets are calculated as Total Assets (Worldscope item #02999) minus Cash and Equivalents
(Worldscope item #02001). The investment ratio is measured in domestic currency. Our investment
measure includes investment in intangibles. Moreover, it does not exclude depreciation so it is a gross
4Appendix A lists and describes the variables used in the paper.
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gure. Because some rms grow at extreme rates, we winsorize the corporate investment measure at the
99th percentile values for the whole sample in order to reduce the inuence of these extreme observations.
As a rst indication of the impact of the euro on corporate investments, Table 2 reports the mean
and median level of investments in the pre-euro time period (1995-1998) and the post-euro time period
(1999-2002) both for euro and non-euro rms. Appendix B details these measures by country. Table 2
also presents mean and median pre- and post-euro investments for euro-countries split into weak- and
strong-euro countries, respectively, depending on the strength of their currencies prior to the introduction
of the common currency. Weakeuro countries are dened as those that su¤ered a currency crisis in the
years before the introduction of the euro (Finland, Ireland, Italy, Portugal, and Spain).5 The other euro-
area countries (Austria, Belgium, Germany, France, Luxembourg, and Netherlands) did not experience
signicant currency depreciations during the European Monetary System crisis in early 1990s hence the
label strong-euro countries. The classication into weakand strongeuro countries is important, because
Bris et al. (2003b) show that weak-euro rms experience a signicant increase in their valuations after the
introduction of the euro, as opposed to strong-euro rms, which do not show any signicant increase in
their valuations. Higher valuations should of course in turn lead to increased investments. Notice that the
labels of weakand strongeuro countries only apply to the weakness and strength of the currencies prior
to the introduction of the euro and not to the overall economic performance of the respective countries.
[Insert Table 2: Investment Measure]
In the pre-euro period, investment rate in the non-euro area is 17:3 percent on average per year which is
5 In the autumn of 1992 a wave of speculative attacks hit the European exchange rate mechanism (ERM) and its periphery.
Before the end of the year, ve countries (Finland, Italy, Norway, Sweden, and the U.K.) had oated their currencies. Despite
attempts by a number of countries to remain in the ERM with the assistance of devaluations (Ireland, Portugal, and Spain),
the system was unsalvageable.
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signicantly higher than in the euro-area (14:2 percent mean rate, signicantly di¤erent at the one percent
level). Within the euro-area, investment rates are larger in strong countries (14:9 percent) than in weak
countries (12:2 percent) and the di¤erence between the two groups is statistically signicant from zero (t
statistic is 3:2).
In the post-euro period, the pattern is very similar, although we do not nd signicant di¤erences
between weak- and strong-euro countries. Relative to the pre-1999 period, investments in Europe decrease
overall and the decline is lower in euro-countries ( 3:8 percent change in investment rates, signicantly
di¤erent from zero) than in non-euro countries ( 5:0 percent change, signicantly di¤erent from zero).
The di¤erence between the two gures is statistically signicant at the ve percent level. Moreover,
investment rates decline more in strong-euro countries ( 4:3 percent change) than in weak-euro countries
( 2:3 percent change). Of course these numbers ignore cross-sectional di¤erences in rm size, protability,
and investments opportunities which can only be uncovered in panel regressions.
3 Firm investments and the introduction of the euro
3.1 Methods
In the standard Q-theory of investment, a value-maximizing rm will invest as long as the shadow
value of an additional unit of capital the marginal Q exceeds unity. The model assumes away taxes and
capital market imperfections and has the advantage that Q controls for the market evaluation of the rms
investments opportunities (Hayashi, 1982; Fazzari et al., 1988). Therefore, Q is a su¢ cient statistic for
investments as long as one takes into account measurement errors and endogeneity in the calculation of Q.
Several empirical papers have shown that Q does not capture all relevant information about the expected
future protability of investments, especially when rms face nancial constraints (Fazzari et al., 1988),
while others have documented systematic measurement errors in Q (Erickson and Whited, 2000).
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Our econometric specication is based on the standard investment equation where investments depend
on Q and other controls that measure rms future investment opportunities. We use dummy variables to
quantify the impact of the common currency on rmsinvestments. We recognize that Q is endogenous.
Bris, Koskinen and Nilsson (2003b) nd that companies in the euro area experience signicant increases in
Tobins Q after 1998 relative to non-euro companies. We therefore estimate a xed-e¤ects panel regression
model with instrumental variables for the 1994-2002 time period. The dependent variable is investments,
measured as total investments divided by non-cash assets. The impact of the euro is measured using three
di¤erent dummy variables. The rst dummy variable, Euro country  post-euro time period, takes the
value one for rms in the euro-countries for years 1999-2002 and zero otherwise. Similarly, we construct
two dummy variables indicating rms in the strong- and weak-euro countries, respectively, for the post-
euro time period (Strong-euro country  post-euro time period and Weak-euro country  post-euro
time period). More formally, let Iict be investment rate for rm i in country c in year t, and EUROct be
the dummy variable(s) indicating whether the euro was adopted or not by country c in year t: We then
estimate the following regression model with OLS using annual observations:
Iict = Yt + Fi +  Xict +  Mct +   EUROct +  Qit 1 + "ict, (1)
where Yt is the xed time e¤ect for year t, Fi is the xed rm e¤ect for rm i, the set Xict represent time
varying rm characteristics, and the set Mct represents time-varying country characteristics. The e¤ect of
the euro is estimated in b.
We estimate equation (1) with instrumental variables, where we instrument the rm-specic Q using
euro dummies, rm-specic characteristics and country-specic characteristics in the following way:
Qit = Yt + Fi +  Xict + ' Mct +   EUROct +   Zict + ict (2)
In our baseline 2SLS-specication we use the absolute change in the logarithm of the rms Q and the
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absolute change in the logarithm of the industrys Q all lagged as instruments in Zict. Changes in Q
measure the variability in rms investment opportunities that are exogenous to investments if markets
incorporate their e¤ect in the last years Q. Changes in Q also proxy for the cost of adjustment of past
investment to Q which are incorporated into current values of Q (see Hayashi and Inoue, 1991).6
One of the most important trends in Europe in the 1990s was a reduction in interest rates, espe-
cially for the weak-euro countries. Prior to the introduction of the euro, the weak-euro countries su¤ered
from credibility problems in their monetary policies resulting in high real interest rates. In addition, the
Maastricht Treaty of 1992 established criteria to join the EMU which included reduction in ination rates,
bond yields and government decit. Therefore we also estimate an additional specication of the 2SLS
investment regression including the changes in interest rates. Moreover, while current changes in interest
rates and term spread should be related to investment rates, the past values should not. Therefore we can
use the past values of interest rates as additional instruments for last years Q. More specically, when we
estimate the investment regression including the interest rates we use the changes from t =  1 to t = 0 in
the 6-month risk free rate and term spread (10 year government bond rate minus the 6-month T-bill rate)
for each country as explanatory variables and the lagged levels of these variables as additional instruments
for Q.
We also control for a set of macroeconomic variables. As a measure of a countrys economic development,
we control for the lagged growth rate in real GDP and the lagged log of GDP per capita (in constant euros).
Additionally, we control for the relative change in domestic currency with respect to the U.S. dollar. The
6 In all of our tables, we report a Hansen-Sargan test of overidentifying restrictions. The joint null hypothesis is that
the instruments are valid instruments, i.e. uncorrelated with the error term and that the excluded instruments are correctly
excluded from the estimated equation. Under the null, the test statistic is distributed as chi-squared in the number of
overidentifying restrictions. A rejection casts doubt on the validity of the instruments. In all cases we fail to reject the null
hypothesis at reasonable levels of condence.
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reason is that one main argument for the U.K. not joining the euro was that U.K. rms are more exposed
to risks with the dollar than with the euro. By controlling for the domestic currency/dollar exchange
rate, we capture the level of rm investment that is driven by the exposure to the dollar. The year-
xed e¤ects capture common time trends across both euro and noneuro rms. By using rm-xed
e¤ects, we simultaneously control for both constant country factors (e.g., taxation, accounting rules, legal
environment) and for constant rm factors (e.g., industry e¤ects). Furthermore, because we use xed
e¤ects, estimators will be based on the timeseries, withinrm variation in variables. Since the objective
of our study is to investigate whether there is a regimeswitch in rms investment activities after the
introduction of the euro, xed e¤ects regressions seem particularly suitable.7
The euro can a¤ect investments through two di¤erent channels: by increasing rmsinvestment oppor-
tunities (in which case we expect the coe¢ cients  and  to be positive and signicant); and by relaxing
nancial constraints, in which case we expect  and  to be positive and signicant, but also  to be
signicantly di¤erent from zero. The reason is that relaxation of nancial constraints should a¤ect Q and
then investments, but should also have a direct e¤ect on investments which is not captured by Q. In that
sense, a test of whether  is statistically signicant from zero is a test of the null hypothesis that the euro
has a¤ected nancial constraints for euro rms.
3.2 Main results
In Table 3 we report the results of panel regressions of our measure of investments on a set of explanatory
variables. Detailed denitions of all variables used can be found in the Appendix A. We rst control for
rm-specic characteristics that are well-known to determine a rms investment policy: protability,
measured by cash ow divided by total assets (Kaplan and Zingales, Fazzari et al., 1988, McConnell and
Servaes, 1990); and leverage, measured by total debt to total assets (Myers and Majluf, 1984). Both
7Following Bertrand, Duo, and Mullainathan (2004) we cluster standard errors by country.
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variables are lagged. We also control for the ratio of cash holdings to total assets. Several papers have
shown a positive relationship between cash holdings and investment (Lamont, 1997; Gertler and Hubbard,
1988; Kashyap, Lamont, and Stein, 1994). We also control for the size of the rms by including the log of
total sales (in thousands of euros). Finally, we control for Tobins Q, which is measured as rm specic,
instrumented Q. We rst report results on the rst-stage regressions (regressions 1 and 3) and then the
results for the investment equation (regressions 2 and 4).
Table 3 provides regression results for two specications depending on whether we control for interest
rate variables. Protability and cash holdings are positively and signicantly related to investments; more
levered rms, and larger rms, invest less. Finally, corporate investments are unrelated to macro variables
once we control for rm-xed e¤ects. We conrm a positive relationship between rms Q and corporate
investment. A 100 percent increase in Q is associated with a 12:8 percent increase in investments (signicant
at the one percent level). In the rst-stage regression, we nd several variables to determine Q: protability
(+), cash holdings (+), GDP growth (+), the relative change in domestic/USD exchange rate (-), and the
absolute change in log(Q) in the previous period (+). The interpretation of the last two coe¢ cients is
that rms are more valuable in a country the stronger the currency, and that the variability in investments
opportunities is associated with higher rm value. Moreover, our results are consistent with Bris, Koskinen
and Nilsson (2003b): the euro is associated with a signicant increase in rmsQ of 9:9 percent (signicant
at the ve percent level).
Overall, and without controlling for changes in interest rates in the Q equation, the increase in Q
translates into an increase in rmsinvestments of 1:27 percent (9:9 percent of 12:8 percent). However,
the direct e¤ect of the euro on investments cancels out the indirect increase of the euro on investments
through Q.
[Insert Table 3: Main Regression: Investments and the Euro]
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Without controlling for interest rates, the euro dummy has a signicant coe¢ cient of  0:012 in the
investment equation (equation 2) which means that through its e¤ect on market frictions possibly nancial
constraints the euro has reduced rm investments by 1:2 percent. This direct e¤ect disappears, however,
when we control for changes in interest rates. When we control for interest rates in the instrumental
equation, the indirect e¤ect of the euro becomes insignicant since the e¤ect of the euro on Q is marginally
insignicant. These results imply that for the overall sample the euro has not had any impact on investments
when the changes in interest rates are controlled for. Interest rates are a major part of cost of capital and
hence also should play a major role in determining Q. We conjecture that the direct e¤ect also becomes
insignicant because interest rates are associated with the availability of external nancing and therefore
with the impact of nancial constraints on rm investments. Section 5 analyzes such relationship.
In the next sections we analyze these results in detail. First, we classify countries and rms depending on
specic characteristics to determine whether the euro has had a di¤erential e¤ect in any of these subgroups.
Then we study the impact of nancial constraints on investments to determine whether the signicance of
the euro dummy in the investment regression is associated with a change in nancial constrains for rms
in the euro area.
4 Investments and rm characteristics
4.1 Strong-euro vs. weak-euro countries
We rst analyze the e¤ect of the euro for the two groups of countries with weak currencies (weak-euro
countries) and strong currencies (strong-euro countries). These results are in Table 4. In weak-euro
countries, the euro is associated with increases in investments of 2:2 percent (0:173  0:126), relative
to non-euro countries (results are similar when we control for changes in interest rates). Relative to the
average rate in Table 2, this means that the euro accounts for 22 percent of the investment rate in weak-euro
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countries after 1998. Moreover, we do not nd any direct e¤ect of the euro on investments in weak-euro
countries. The euro a¤ects investments only through the increases in Tobin´s Q.
[Insert Table 4: Weak vs. Strong euro Countries: Investment and the Euro]
The results are reversed for strongeuro countries. Consistent with Bris et al. (2003b), Tobins Q
is unrelated to the euro for rms in the strong-euro area. However, once we control for Q, investment
rates are negatively a¤ected by the euro in these countries (signicant coe¢ cient of  0:017 when we do
not control for interest rates and  0:014 when we do). This reduction represents about 16 percent of the
investment rate in strong-euro countries after 1998.
Our results in this section show that for the weak-euro countries the indirect positive e¤ect through an
increase in Q is the dominant euro e¤ect. This is consistent with a reduction of the cost of capital and an
increase in investment opportunities being the ultimate causes for increased investments for rms in the
weak-euro countries. These are the countries for which an elimination of intra-European currency risks
was deemed to be ex ante most benecial. With respect to strong-euro countries, our results document
a negative direct euro e¤ect. Potential reasons for this result could be that nancing is harder to get or
alternatively that some rms are reorganizing and thus reducing investments. We later study more closely
the reasons behind this result by examining the role of nancial constraints.
4.2 Results by size
Our next step is to determine which rms benet the most from the euro. Bartram and Karolyi (2003)
show that large rms have benetted more from European monetary integration in terms of reduction
in market risk. Dahlquist and Robertsson (2001) and Kang and Stulz (1997) also show that large rms
benet more from nancial market integration because foreigners tend to invest in large rms. As a result
large rmsinvestor base increases and cost of capital decreases.
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We classify rms in our sample based on the value of total sales in 1997 and compare that value to
the median sales within each country. There are 5; 640 observations in the group of small (at or below-
median) rms and 5; 568 observations in the group of large rms. We replicate our investment regressions
in Table 5 where we interact the euro dummies with dummies for rm size. We provide tests of di¤erences
in coe¢ cients.
[Insert Table 5: Small vs. Large Firms: Investment and the Euro]
We nd that for small rms in general irrespective of euro membership Q decreases by 4:5 percent
after 1998. However, for small rms in weak-euro countries the euro increases Qs by 14:1 percent ( 0:186
minus 0:045) compared to non-euro rms and by 18:6 percent compared to similar small rms in non-euro
countries. These increases correspond to an indirect increase in investments of 1:7 percent (compared to
all non-euro rms) and 2:3 percent (compared to small non-euro rms). Large rms in weak-euro countries
experience an increase in Qs of 15:8 percent which corresponds to an indirect 2:0 percent increase in
investments relative to similar non-euro rms. Di¤erences between small and large rms in weak-euro
countries are not signicantly di¤erent from zero. Firms in weak-euro countries fare better than rms in
strong-euro countries overall (di¤erences are signicantly di¤erent from zero).
Consistent with earlier results, the e¤ect of the euro for weak-euro rms is fully captured by increases
in Q. However, for strong-euro rms investment is directly negatively related to the euro. This negative
e¤ect is more pronounced for small rms. In principle the negative direct e¤ect could happen because of
increased di¢ culties in getting nancing or that rms are reorganizing and cutting capacity and thus do
not need to invest that much.
To summarize this section, we nd that, irrespective of size, rms in weak-euro countries increase
investments more than similar rms outside the euro-area. These increases in investments reect increases
in market valuations. In addition, once we control for rms Q, we still nd that small rms in strong-euro
countries reduce investments after 1998 relative to non-euro countries.
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4.3 Results by exchange rate exposure
The positive e¤ect of the euro on investments for rms in the weak-euro countries is consistent with a
real impact of the removal of exchange rate risks since rms in these countries are ex ante rms for which
the elimination of currency risks is the most valuable. In this section we directly classify rms depending
on their exposure to currency risk and replicate the investment regressions.
We measure exchange rate exposure by calculating the sensitivity of a rms stock price to uctuations
in the domestic currency with respect to the synthetic euro. We estimate exchange rate betas (ERBs)
with a two-factor model where the other factor is the market return8. We estimate ERBs using monthly
data from January 1992 to December 1994. We deliberately choose an estimation period that is before
our sample period in order to avoid potential endogeneity problems. We classify rms into three groups
depending on the sign and signicance of their ERB estimates. Negative ERB rms(146 rms, 9:6 percent
of the sample) stock returns are negatively a¤ected when the domestic currency depreciated with respect to
the euro and positive ERB rms(73 rms, 4:9 percent of the sample) stock returns are positively a¤ected
when the domestic currency depreciated with respect to the euro. The third group of rms (1; 269 rms,
85:5 percent of the sample) did not have any signicant exchange rate exposure.
We expect rms with negative ERBs to benet more from the euro since all the large and sudden
changes in exchange rates within Europe have been devaluations and hedging against large and sudden
exchange rate changes is either very expensive or practically impossible.
[Insert Table 6: Negative vs. Positive ERB: Investments and the Euro]
We nd that, among rms in strong-euro countries, the euro is associated with an additional decrease
in market valuations for rms with positive exposure to exchange rate changes (exporting rms). The
overall e¤ect, however, is zero when we take into account the small positive valuation e¤ect for all strong-
8The calculation of exchange rate betas is described in detail in Appendix C.
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euro rms. Conversely, rms with negative exposure (importing rms) increase in value after 1998. The
results are similar for exposed weak-euro rms, although the coe¢ cient for positive ERB rms is not
signicantly di¤erent from zero. Economically, the e¤ects of the euro depending on currency exposure
are high in magnitude: among strong-euro rms, rms with positive exposure reduce investments by 0:8
( 0:061  0:135) percent (from Table 2 strong-euro rms reduce investments 4:3 percent after 1998 so
19 percent of such reduction is due to the elimination of currency risk). Firms with negative exposure
increase investments 0:6 percent (relative to a total reduction in investments of 4:3 percent). With respect
to rms in weak-euro countries, negative ERB rms increase investments 0:7 percent relative to other
weak-euro rms. Moreover, the di¤erence between strong- and weak-euro countries is signicant for rms
with positive exposure, and for rms with negative exposure. Therefore, reinforcing the results in section
4.4.2, the increase in investments is larger for rms that we expect ex ante to benet the most from the
elimination of the possibility to devalue: rms in weakeuro countries and also those rms which are
harmed by currency depreciations.
Once we control for Q, we nd a negative direct impact of the euro on investments for those strong-
euro rms that have no signicant exchange rate exposure. These rms are purely domestic rms with
no exposure to foreign markets or alternatively rms that have hedged their exposure. The decline in
investments is 1:8 (signicant at the one percent level) when we do not control for interest rates or 1:5
percent (signicant at the ve percent level) when the impact of interest rates is controlled for.
To summarize, we have established that the euro a¤ects investments positively for rms from the weak-
euro countries. The channel that the euro operates is the indirect channel of increasing Qs. This indirect
channel is especially strong for rms that were negatively a¤ected by currency depreciations. This points
to a conclusion that a decrease in cost of capital is the main reason for increased investments. For the rms
from strong-euro countries, the direct e¤ect of the euro dominates. The euro has decreased investments
especially for small rms and for rms that were not exposed to currency risks. We next try to shed light
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on this phenomenon by studying the impact of nancial constraints.
5 Investments and nancial constraints
5.1 Constrained vs. unconstrained rms
So far we have shown that the e¤ects for the weak-euro rms are consistent with the Q theory of
investment since the e¤ect of the euro is reected in the market valuation of rmsinvestment opportunities
Tobins Q which indeed determines actual investment rates.
Our previous results also show a signicant negative direct e¤ect of the common currency on investments
which is not captured by Q. As Hayashi (1982), Jorgenson (1971), and Fazzari et al. (1988) among others
have shown, any determinant of investments that is not captured by Q is a reection of some kind of
market frictions typically resulting in rms being nancially constrained. Since we have shown that the
euro has a negative direct e¤ect on some rmsinvestments, it is possible that the euro has limited some
rms access to nancial markets. However, it can be argued that the euro should improve rmsaccess
to nancing. Using the methodology developed by Rajan and Zingales (1998), Guiso et al. (2004) argue
that nancial integration in Europe will benet most the countries that have the least developed nancial
markets. The reason is that the euro makes it easier rms from less developed countries to access more
developed nancial markets in other euro-countries. Also regulatory harmonization within the EU should
lead to better functioning nancial markets and thus to relaxation of nancing constraints. In this section
we analyze what is the role of nancial constraints in determining rmsinvestments. If the euro has made
it harder for some rms to access nancial markets, then it is the nancially constrained rms that should
experience the largest negative impact. If the euro has improved rmsaccess to nancial markets, the
nancially constrained rms should demonstrate the largest positive impact.
We compute a measure of nancial constraints for all the rms in our sample using the methodology in
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Kaplan and Zingales (1997)9. We construct a synthetic index of nancial constraints based on rmscash
ows, dividends, cash balances and leverage as in Lamont et al. (2001), Rajan and Zingales (1998) and
Baker et al. (2003) among others10. Although this index ("KZ-index") was developed using US rms, we
think it is the best measure available that is ready to be used and has received recognition in the nance
literature as a measure of nancing constraints. We compute the index based on data from 1997 in order
to ensure that rms were nancially constrained just prior to the introduction of the euro (1998 can be
seen as a transition year and is thus too late to use for the classication).
We next classify rms according to whether their KZ-index is above or below the median values of
the KZ-index within their respective countries11 and estimate the investment regression. High KZ-index
indicates that the rm is nancially constrained. Results are in Table 7.
[Insert Table 7: Constrained vs Unconstrained Firms: Investment and the Euro]
To gauge the impact of nancial constraints, we rst measure the impact of nancial constraints for
non-euro rms. This e¤ect is reected in the coe¢ cient of the variable "Constrained rm x post-euro
dummy". The coe¢ cient is negative and signicantly di¤erent from zero at the one percent level, suggesting
that constrained rms invest 3:9   4:0 percent less than unconstrained rms in non-euro countries after
1998. Within weak-euro countries, we nd that nancially unconstrained rms enjoy a larger increase in
Tobins Q. The di¤erence between nancially constrained and nancially unconstrained rms is signicantly
di¤erent at the 10 percent rate (regressions 1 and 3). Overall, the indirect increase in investments for
9We have also used payment of dividends as way of dening nancing constraints, as in Fazzari et al. (1998). The results
are very similar to the results we get using the methodology of Kaplan and Zingales. Thus the results are omitted.
10See Appendix D for details on how to compute the index of nancial constraints.
11By classifying rms as constrained or unconstrained relative to other rms within each individual country, we control for
cross-country di¤erences in the index components that have nothing to do with nancial constraints.
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nancially unconstrained rms as a result of the common currency is 2:8 percent ( 0:221  0:128 ) and
1:58 percent for nancially constrained rms. We also nd evidence of direct increases in investments due
to the euro. Investments have increased directly by 2:5 percent for nancially constrained rms from the
weak-euro countries after controlling for Q when we take the impact of interest rates into account
To summarize we nd in this section that among weakeuro rms, the euro has increased investments
indirectly through an increase in Q. We also nd some evidence that the euro has improved constrained
rmsaccess to nancial markets. The indirect e¤ect is consistent with ndings in Bris et al. (2003b). The
e¤ect of the euro on nancial constraints is consistent with the arguments in Guiso et al. (2004).
The indirect results for rms in strong-euro countries are not statistically signicant. We nd, however,
negative direct e¤ect for unconstrained rms in strong-euro countries: unconstrained rms in strong-euro
countries have investment rates which are 3 percent lower than for non-euro rms after 1998, controlling
for the e¤ect of Q on investment. There are some possible explanations for this nding. First of all, this
result is not consistent with the explanation that the euro has made it harder for rms to access nancial
markets. If that claim were true then we should expect the nancially constrained rms rms that need
external nancing the most to be a¤ected the most. This is not the case.
It may be that the euro has made nancially unconstrained rms constrained. We have tested this
hypothesis by estimating an ordered probit model where the endogenous variable is the change in KZ-
index from the pre-euro period to the post-euro period (taking values of zero if the KZ-index changes
within 0:5 standard deviations, and 1 depending on whether it increases or decreases more than 0:5
standard deviations). Controlling for the level of the pre-euro KZ-index, changes in interest rates, as well
as countryand rmspecic controls, we nd that the pre-euro KZ-index is signicantly and negatively
related to changes in the KZ-index. This is not surprising since the most nancially constrained rm in
the sample can only stay the same or else become less constrained and the opposite. However, we do not
nd evidence that rms that were nancially unconstrained become more constrained.
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An alternative explanation is that some rms in strong-euro countries are reorganizing and perhaps
cutting capacity. If there is overcapacity then there is naturally no need to invest that much. For nancially
constrained rms there may be two opposing factors: the euro has made it easier to obtain nancing, but
due to reorganization there is not that much need for external nancing. These two e¤ects may cancel
each other out. For nancially constrained rms there is only the latter e¤ect: rms do not want to invest
that much and hence those rms experience a decline in investments.
5.2 Financial constraints and bond markets
Rajan and Zingales (2003), Pagano and Von Thadden (2004), and Detken and Hartmann (2002) em-
phasize the dramatic growth in bond issuance in the euro area after 1998. In particular, Detken and
Hartmann (2002) report that the share of bond issues in euros as a percentage of total issuance activity in
the world rises from 20 percent to 29 percent by early 2002. Rajan and Zingales (2003) provide panel data
evidence that such increase is due to the euro. The euro may have opened access to the bond market to
companies that were previously unable to do so and thus may have reduced their nancial constraints, for
instance, by reducing hold-up problems with banks. Therefore it is interesting to analyze whether bond
issuance activity allows rms to invest more. This would imply a direct e¤ect of the euro on investments
through the removal of nancial constraints.
We start by compiling a dataset of all debt issues by rms in Europe in the period 1995-2002 from
the Securities Data Corporation. We obtain information on the identity of the issuer, principal amount,
type of security, market of issuance and coupon and maturity characteristics. We classify debt issues into
private debt and public bonds and aggregate the principal amount by company and year when a rm makes
several issues with the same characteristics in a given year. There are initially 1; 920 issues over the entire
period, corresponding to 1; 106 single issuer-year observations. We then match the resulting panel with
our balanced panel of rm-year observations, and we are left with 301 rm-year observations with some
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issuance activity.12
We now proceed to analyze the impact of bond issuance activity on rm investments. In Table 8 we
implement our investment regressions using a public debt issue dummy as a determinant of Tobins Q and
investments. We do not nd any signicant e¤ect of nancing on Q but there is a signicant impact of
bond issuance activity on investments. Bond issuers invest 2:3 percent more than non-issuers. This result
shows that access to public debt markets has a signicant positive impact on investments. This result may
indicate that some rms were nancially constrained before and due to more developed bond markets after
the introduction of the euro are able to invest more. Interestingly, even after controlling for bond issuance
activity, nancially unconstrained rms in strong-euro countries invest 2:7 percent less after 1998.
[Insert Table 8: Bond Issuance, Financial Constraints Investment and the Euro]
In Panel B we interact our measure of nancial constraints with the bond issue dummy. Regarding the
di¤erence between nancially unconstrained and nancially constrained rms, we obtain similar results to
those in Table 7. We then nd that bond issuers in general increase investments by 3:5 percent after 1998.
Constrained rms invest 3:8 percent less than similar rms and 9:8 percent less (3:8 + 5:8) if they issue
bonds. This is not due to the euro since it happens for all rms, irrespective of their euro membership.
We additionally nd a signicant e¤ect of bond issuance activity for nancially constrained rms in
strong-euro countries: rms of this type that issue bonds increase investments by 2:8 + 5:7 = 8:5 percent
more relative to non-euro rms. In addition to the indirect valuation e¤ect of 2:8, bond issuers invest 5:7
percent more relative to non-euro rms because of a relaxation of their nancial constraints. This provides
some evidence in favor of Guiso et al. (2004). However, the e¤ect of the euro on the nancial constraints
of bond issuers becomes insignicant once we control for changes in interest rates.
12Since we have 1; 401 rms in our sample and the total available rms that exist at least one year is above 6; 000, we lose
roughly one out of four issuers. Therefore the sample of bond issues is still quite representative.
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Access to public bond markets increases signicantly rmsinvestments after controlling for rm char-
acteristics. Bond issuance also has a positive impact both directly and indirectly on constrained strong-euro
rmsinvestments after 1998 although the direct e¤ect is only signicant in one of the specications. Bond
issuance activity does not have a positive indirect or direct e¤ect on weak-euro rms investments. In-
terestingly, the euro still has a negative direct e¤ect on investments for rms that come from strong-euro
countries and that are unconstrained. This result is consistent with the view that the investments have
declined for those rms for reasons that are unrelated to nancing. A plausible, consistent explanation is
that these rms do not want to invest more because they are restructuring and cutting capacity.
6 Robustness tests
6.1 Time e¤ects
The data we use in this paper consist primarily of end-of-year accounting information. Considering 1999
as the year of introduction of the euro implies that the data for 1999 reects the real e¤ects of the actual
introduction of the common currency. However, already on May 2, 1998 the European Council decided
on which countries were allowed to enter the nal phase of the euro. Thus, choosing (the end of) 1998 as
the rst year of the euro seems also reasonable. Even this choice can be considered too conservative, given
that forward looking markets are likely to have taken into account the e¤ects of the introduction of the
euro already at the end of 1997, or even earlier.
In this section we perform robustness tests pertaining to the date of introduction of the euro as well
as the time persistence of the e¤ects we identify in the previous section. Table 9 reports the results. To
isolate a possible temporary e¤ect in 1998, we construct two time dummies, one that equals one in 1998 and
afterwards, zero otherwise; and another one that takes value one in 1999 and afterwards, zero otherwise.
We interact these time dummies with euro-country indicators and run our standard investment regressions.
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Table 19 shows that the main e¤ect of the euro on investments does not happen before 1999.
[Insert Table 9: Anticipation Effects]
Ideally we would like to perform a long-run analysis of the e¤ects of the euro but for obvious reasons
our horizon does not extend more than ve years after its introduction. Results in Table 9 show at least
that the e¤ects of the common currency on investments have not been temporary.
6.2 Results by industry
Our next robustness test analyzes whether the e¤ects we identify in the previous sections are driven
by rms in a particular industry. The existing evidence supports the view that the e¤ects of the euro
have been widespread across industries. Hardouvelis et al. (2004) study the impact of euro on the cost of
equity capital. They nd that the cost of equity has been reduced in Europe in all industries except for
information technology and cyclical consumer goods. Bris et al. (2003b) nd that the positive valuation
e¤ects of the euro are signicant in all sectors, except for non-cyclical services with a similar methodology
to ours.
[Insert Table 10: Industry Effects]
We classify rms in our sample into ve industry groups: Manufacturing; Transportation, Commu-
nications and Utilities; Wholesale and Retail Trade; Services; and Basic Industries. This classication
is based on SIC codes reported by Worldscope. We nd signicant e¤ects for strong-euro countries in
all non-manufacturing sectors. For those sectors investments have decreased after controlling for the in-
vestment opportunities. The direct euro e¤ect on investments is  3:2 percent for Trade,  4:6 percent for
Services, and  6:8 percent for Communications, Transportation, and Utilities. These results are consistent
with the view that the non-tradable sector in strong-euro countries has previously overinvested and is now
restructuring and hence investing less. From the previous results we know that the negative direct euro
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e¤ect on investments also holds for small companies and for companies that are not exposed to exchange
rate risks. These companies are also more likely to be in non-manufacturing sector.
The other main result in this section is that our previous ndings for the weak-euro countries are not
driven by any particular industry since investments increase in all industries, and such e¤ect is reected by
increases in Tobins Q. Investment increases due to the indirect euro e¤ect are 1:85 percent for Manufac-
turing, 1:12 percent for Trade, 4:45 percent for Services, 3:16 percent for Communications, Transportation,
and Utilities; and 2:50 percent for Basic Industries.
6.3 Are the results driven by a particular country?
Table 1 shows that most of the rms in our sample of euro rms (374 out of 713, or 52 percent) are
either French or German, while most of the rms in the sample of noneuro rms ( 444 out of 688, or 65
percent) are from the U.K. As a last robustness check, we replicate our regressions after excluding rms
from France, Germany, and the U.K., from the sample. Results are in Table 11 Panel A.
[Insert Table 11: Results Excluding the Big Countries]
Excluding the three big countries reduces the number of observations by two thirds and leaves the
e¤ect of the euro insignicant, especially once we control for interest rates. One can argue that the lack of
signicance is driven by a reduced number of observations but this does not explain why the coe¢ cients
for weak-euro countries become insignicant with all the weak-euro countries still in the sample. Therefore
we try the alternative of excluding only the U.K. in one specication and only France and Germany in
another. The rst alternative provides similar results to Table 11 Panel A and are therefore not reported
in the paper. However, Panel B of Table 11 shows that removing France and Germany from the sample
(both strong-euro countries) provides signicant results that are consistent with the Q theory of investment.
Without controlling for interest rates, Tobins Q for strong-euro countries (other than France and Germany)
increases by 7:7 percent which translates in an increase investments of 1 percent, relative to non-euro rms.
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This result is not signicant after controlling for interest rates. Similarly, Tobins Q for weak-euro countries
increases 18:7 percent after 1998 which implies an investment rate 2:43 higher than non-euro rms. The
result persists after using interest rates as instruments (although the e¤ect on investment is now 1:4
percent).
We can therefore conclude that it is among French and German companies that the euro has had a
negative impact on investments and that negative impact is unrelated to the market valuation of rms
investment opportunities.
7 Conclusions
The introduction of the euro in January 1999 has led to a whole body of literature devoted to analyzing
the e¤ects of the common currency on countries and rms. At the macroeconomic level, we have evidence
regarding the e¤ects of the euro on: trade, ination, transmission of monetary shocks, yield spreads, scal
policy harmonization, among others.13 At the corporate level, there are studies that analyze the impact
on market risk (Bartram and Karolyi, 2003) and the cost of capital (Sentana, 2002; Hardouvelis et al.
2004; Bris et al., 2003b). This paper contributes to this growing literature by documenting a signicant
e¤ect of the euro on the real economic activity at the corporate level. We show that the common currency
has resulted in an increase in the investment rates which is consistent with the positive valuation e¤ects
reported in previous studies. In addition, we show that the euro has made it easier to access nancing in
Europe.
Our results show that the euro has benetted companies in the euro-countries. This is true for all
companies that come from countries that previously had weak currencies. In addition, the euro has had
a positive e¤ect on the investment rates for those rms coming from the strong-euro countries that have
13See EMU: Assessing the Impact of the Euro, special issue of Economic Policy, October 2003.
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had access to corporate bond markets. Thus our assessment of the euro is more positive than the received
wisdom among European pundits who seem to think that the common currency has not resulted in any
positive economic e¤ects. To be fair, even our study nds that the euro has not been benecial to most
companies that hail from the strong-euro countries. Especially for France and Germany, the assessment at
this point has to be negative.
Our approach can be seen as a reduced-form analysis on the relationship between investments and Q,
in the presence of a shock to the cost of capital and to rmsnancial constraints. There are papers which
explicitly model such relationship in the presence of shocks (see Love, 2003). We build upon classic models
of investments where anything di¤erent from a market friction a¤ects investments only through an e¤ect
on Tobins Q. Our simple approach yields easily interpretable results.
We deem our contribution important not only for academics interested in the e¤ects of common cur-
rencies. The euro is by itself a natural experiment that represented a shock to rms in its area: because
of an elimination of currency risks, rms face a lower cost of capital and better investment opportunities.
Therefore, by measuring the impact of the euro on rmsinvestment, we contribute to the international
nance literature by showing that elimination of currency risks do have major valuation e¤ects that lead
also to signicant real e¤ects. In addition, our results show that the introduction of the euro has fos-
tered the development of European nancial markets. This has led to improved access to nancing and
increased investments. Thus, improving investor protection or securities laws are not the only ways to
achieve positive results on the development of nancial markets.
Our paper calls for a natural extension. After looking at value and investment changes driven by the
introduction of the euro, the next question is how these investments have been nanced. As Stulz (1999)
points out, a reduction in the cost of capital entails a reduction in the cost of equity as well as in the cost
of debt. Therefore, it would be of great relevance to investigate whether nancial integration and cost of
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capital reductions lead to a preference of equity over debt, or vice versa.14
14Our preliminary results in Bris, Koskinen, and Nilsson (2003a) suggest, that the investments have been nanced with
debt.
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A Appendix: Variable denitions
Variable Definition (item # refers to Worldscope field)
Investment ratet [Capital expenditures (item #04601) + Net Assets from Acquisitions (item #04355)
+ Additions to other assets (item #04651) + R&D expenses (item #01201)]t ¸ [Total
assets (item #02999) – cash & short term investments (item #02001)]t-1. The values
of the components are expressed in domestic currency and adjusted for inflation
using the GDP-deflator. Thus, this variable captures real investments.
Cash flow/assetst-1 Funds from operationst-1 (item #04651) ¸ Total assetst-1 (item #02999)
Cash/assetst-1 Cash & short term investmentst-1 (item #02001) ¸ Total assetst-1 (item #02999)
Leveraget-1 Total debtt-1 (item #03255) ¸ Total assetst-1 (item #02999)
Salest-1 Net salest-1 (item # 01001) expressed in thousands of euro (using a synthetic euro
exchange rate prior to January 1, 1999).
Firm Qt-1 [Market value of common equity (item # 08001) + Total assets (item #02999)– Book
value of common equity (item #03501)]t-1 ¸ Total assetst-1 (item #02999)
Industry Qt-1 The median firm Qt-1 in each two-digit SIC code industry, calculated using all firms
from the sample countries with available data in Worldscope on Qt-1 (irrespective of
whether the firms are included in the regression sample).
GDP growtht-1 The real growth rate in GDP in year t-1.
GDP/capita t-1 Real GDP per capita in year t-1, expressed in euros.
Relative change in domestic/USD
exchange ratet-1
[Domestic currency/USD exchange ratet - domestic currency/USD exchange ratet-1]
¸  domestic currency/USD exchange ratet-1
Absolute change in log(firm Q)t-1 The absolute value of  [log(firm Q)t -1 -  log(firm Q)t-2 ]
Absolute change in log(industry Q)t-1 The absolute value of  [log(industry Q)t-1 -  log(firm Q)t-2 ]
Short-term interest ratet-1 6 month treasury bill yield in year t-1
Term spreadt-1 Difference in yields between 10 year government bond and 6 month treasury bill in
year t-1.
Change in short-term interest ratet Short-term interest ratet - Short-term interest ratet-1
Change in term spreadt Term-spreadt - Term-spreadt-1
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B Appendix: Average corporate investment rates by country before
and after the introduction of the euro
The sample is a balanced panel of 1401 firms from the Euro-countries (except Greece) and five Non-euro countries (Denmark,
Norway, Sweden, Switzerland, and UK) with complete data in Worldscope over the time period 1995-2002. The table displays
the average corporate investment rate for the pre-euro time period (1995-1998) and the post-euro time-period (1999-2002),
respectively.  The each firm’s investment rate in year t is calculated as total corporate investments during the year (Worldscope
item #04355 + item #04601 + item #04651 + item #01201) divided by beginning-of-period book value of non-cash assets (item
#02999 – item #02001). The euro-countries classified as weak (i.e., countries with a recent currency crisis) are: Finland, Italy,
Ireland, Portugal and Spain. The corporate investment rate is winsorized at the 99th percentile value of the total sample to reduce
the influence of outliers. For the reported t-tests, * and **, indicates significance at the5%, and 1%-levels, respectively.










Austria 28 0.128 0.091 -0.037
Belgium 39 0.144 0.106 -0.038
Finland 42 0.172 0.131 -0.041
France 175 0.112 0.084 -0.028
Germany 199 0.162 0.109 -0.053
Ireland 17 0.196 0.137 -0.059
Italy 60 0.103 0.089 -0.014
Luxemburg 3 0.127 0.086 -0.041
Netherlands 73 0.217 0.159 -0.058
Portugal 20 0.106 0.079 -0.027
Spain 57 0.088 0.081 -0.007
Non-euro countries:
Denmark 64 0.145 0.134 -0.011
Norway 39 0.249 0.115 -0.134
Sweden 56 0.172 0.113 -0.059
Switzerland 85 0.118 0.103 -0.015
United Kingdom 444 0.182 0.128 -0.053
C Appendix: Calculation of exchange rate exposures
We measure exchange rate exposure by calculating the sensitivity of stock prices to uctuations in
the domestic currency. A commonly used method of calculating a rms exposure to currency risk is to
estimate the following regression:







where Rij is the stock return of rm i in country j, R
j
mis the monthly return on the domestic market
portfolio in country j, Rjx is the monthly change in the exchange rate in country j, and the xi s are then
measures of currency exposure. Such an approach is used by Jorion (1990), Bodnar and Gentry (1993),
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and Amihud (1994).15 We use a similar procedure where we regress individual stock returns on market
returns, and changes in exchange rates. The coe¢ cient xi measures the direct e¤ect of exchange rates on
rm returns, and is henceforth refer to as exchange rate beta (ERB). We estimate the model in (3) using
monthly data from January 1992 through December 1994.16 We deliberately choose an estimation period
that is before our sample period, in order to avoid potential endogeneity problems. Stock price data are
from Datastream.
We calculate exchange rate betas (ERBs) with respect to the euro. Although the euro existed only
after January 1, 1999, Datastream computes a synthetic euro rate based on the weights each currency has
in the real euro. The exchange rates are expressed as units of domestic currency per euro. Because some
rms lack stock return data before 1995, the ERB sample is smaller than our original sample. Because we
dene exchange rates as units of domestic currency per euro, a rm with a positive ERB is most likely
an exporting rm. Similarly, a rm with a negative ERB is most likely an importing rm, a rm with
foreign-denominated liabilities, or both.
We classify rms into three groups depending on the sign and signicance of xi :
-Negative ERB rms, for which xi < 0, and the coe¢ cient in regression (3) is signicant at the ve
percent level of better. Firms with negative ERBs have stock returns that decrease when the domestic
currency depreciates with respect to the euro.
-Positive ERB rms, for which xi > 0, and the coe¢ cient in regression (3) is signicant at the ve
percent level of better. Firms with positive ERBs have stock returns that increase when the domestic
currency depreciates with respect to the euro.
15Jorion (1991) uses a version of this twofactor model, in which the return of the market portfolio is the rst factor and
the component of innovations in the exchange rate that is orthogonal to the market return is the second factor. However the
procedure a¤ects only the estimates of the market beta, not the exchange rate exposures.
16 If there are fewer than 18 observations available per rm, we exclude it from the estimation.
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-The rest of rms, for which the exposure coe¢ cient is not statistically signicant.
Relative to a measure of currency risk based on accounting variables (foreign sales, imports, foreign
debt, exports to sales) our measure incorporates the e¤ect of hedging on a rms exposure. Moreover, it
takes into account the joint e¤ect of a rms decisions with respect to foreign markets, whose interaction is
hard to identify in accounting-based exposure measures. However, ERBs assume that currency exposure
has not changed after 1994.
D Appendix: Measuring nancial constraints
We compute a measure of nancial constraints for all the rms in our sample using the methodology in
Kaplan and Zingales (1997). They estimate an ordered logit regression using a sample of 49 manufacturing
rms. One can construct a synthetic index of nancial constraints using the coe¢ cients in their estimation.
The index we compute is:






+ 0:283Qit + 3:139 Leverageit (4)
where CFit=Ait is cash ow over assets, DIVit=Ait is cash dividends over assets, Cit=Ait is cash balances
over assets, Qit is the rms Q ratio, and Leverageit is the total debt-to-assets ratio. Detailed denitions
of the variables are in the Appendix A. A larger value of the index indicates a more nancially constrained
rm. We compute the index based on data from 1997, in order to ensure that rms were nancially
constrained just prior to the introduction of the euro (1998 can be seen as a transition year, and is thus
too late to use for the classication).
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Table 1. Sample characteristics 
The sample is a balanced panel of 1401 firms from the Euro-countries (except Greece) and five Non-euro countries (Denmark, Norway, Sweden, Switzerland, and UK) with 
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Country # firms  
# firm-year 
observations  Mean Std. dev. Mean Std. dev Mean Std. dev. Mean Std. dev. Mean Std. dev. Mean Std. dev. Mean Std. dev.
Austria 28  224 739.3 1,240.9 1.122 0.287 11.0 11.1 -0.292 1.287 4.0 0.7 1.8 0.7 2.3 1.0 
Belgium 39  312 1,378.1 2,980.5 1.417 0.706 12.5 13.8 -0.002 0.907 4.0 0.9 1.9 0.8 2.5 1.2 
Finland 42  336 1,540.9 3,620.6 1.455 1.281 15.2 14.3 -0.071 0.886 4.1 1.0 2.2 1.1 4.1 1.5 
France 175  1,400 3,707.5 9,668.4 1.364 0.805 9.8 9.7 0.081 2.054 4.4 1.2 1.4 0.6 2.5 1.1 
Germany 199  1,592 2,668.9 8,149.8 1.446 0.875 13.5 13.7 0.108 1.354 4.0 0.8 1.6 0.8 1.7 0.7 
Ireland 17  136 863.0 1,678.2 1.464 0.712 16.6 15.5 -0.522 1.058 5.1 1.1 1.1 1.0 8.9 2.1 
Italy 60  480 3,759.8 9,966.5 1.211 0.568 9.6 11.3 -0.623 1.224 6.4 2.7 1.0 0.8 2.1 0.7 
Luxemburg 3  24 939.9 1,317.2 1.418 0.354 10.6 7.9   n/a n/a 4.0 0.9 1.7 0.8 5.2 3.2 
Netherlands 73  584 3,871.1 11,500.0 1.648 1.043 18.8 18.8 1.060 1.324 3.9 0.8 1.8 0.8 3.2 1.0 
Portugal 20  160 2,088.7 5,044.7 1.367 0.595 8.4 9.2 0.681 1.298 6.2 2.9 0.9 0.8 3.3 0.9 
Spain 57  456 690.3 1,213.1 1.130 0.345 9.2 11.2 -0.401 1.767 5.8 2.2 1.3 0.5 3.4 0.9 
All euro countries  713  5,704 2,773.7 8,238.9 1.398 0.835 12.3 13.2 0.071 1.592 4.7 1.8 1.2 1.2 3.6 2.4 
                  
Denmark 64  512 540.6 870.8 1.645 2.245 14.0 14.6 0.488 1.671 4.6 1.1 1.7 1.0 2.9 1.1 
Norway 39  312 1,003.4 2,686.2 1.497 0.943 18.2 18.2 0.042 2.961 5.8 1.1 0.6 1.4 3.7 1.5 
Sweden 56  448 2,043.8 4,384.1 1.597 1.415 14.2 15.3 -0.323 2.003 5.2 2.0 1.7 0.6 3.2 1.4 
Switzerland 85  680 1,765.6 5,747.4 1.382 0.870 11.0 10.1 -0.003 0.944 2.5 1.0 1.4 0.6 1.4 1.0 
United Kingdom 444  3,552 1,859.8 7,351.8 1.701 1.196 15.5 16.8 -0.627 0.948 6.1 0.8 0.4 1.5 3.1 0.7 
All non-euro countries 688  5,504 1,691.9 6,416.5 1.636 1.307 14.9 16.0 -0.383 1.376 4.8 1.8 1.5 0.9 2.9 1.4 
                  
All countries 1,401  11,208 2,242.4 7,419.6 1.515 1.099 13.6 14.7 -0.154 1.505 4.8 1.8 1.4 1.0 3.3 2.1 
 
Table 2. Average corporate investment rates before and after the introduction of the euro: Euro countries vs. 
non-euro countries  
The sample is a balanced panel of 1401 firms from the Euro-countries (except Greece) and five Non-euro countries (Denmark, 
Norway, Sweden, Switzerland, and UK) with complete data in Worldscope over the time period 1995-2002. The table displays 
the average corporate investment rate for the pre-euro time period (1995-1998) and the post-euro time-period (1999-2002), 
respectively.  The each firm’s investment rate in year t is calculated as total corporate investments during the year (Worldscope 
item #04355 + item #04601 + item #04651 + item #01201) divided by beginning-of-period book value of non-cash assets (item 
#02999 – item #02001). The euro-countries classified as weak (i.e., countries with a recent currency crisis) are: Finland, Italy, 
Ireland, Portugal and Spain. The corporate investment rate is winsorized at the 99th percentile value of the total sample to reduce 
the influence of outliers. For the reported t-tests, * and **, indicates significance at the 5%, and 1%-levels, respectively. 
 





 Pre-euro time 
period   
 Post-euro time 
period  




Euro countries  713  0.142  0.104  -0.038 11.80** 
Strong euro countries 517  0.149  0.106  -0.043 11.69** 
Weak euro countries 196  0.122  0.099  -0.023 3.70** 
         
Non-euro countries:  688  0.173  0.124  -0.050 10.99** 
T-test of difference:                        
Euro vs. non-euro countries                4.84**  4.28**  2.21* 
Strong-euro vs. non-euro countries   3.38**  3.53**  1.12     
Weak euro vs.  non-euro countries    5.92**  4.00**  3.57** 
Strong- vs. weak-euro countries    3.20**  1.18  2.88** 
 
Table 3. The introduction of the euro and corporate investments: OLS and 2SLS regression analysis 
The sample is a balanced panel of 1401 firms from the Euro-countries (except Greece) and five Non-euro countries (Denmark, 
Norway, Sweden, Switzerland, and UK) with complete data in Worldscope over the time period 1995-2002. Estimation by 2SLS. 
The post-euro time period is defined as the years 1999-2002. See Appendix A for other variable definitions. Standard errors are 
reported within brackets. * and **, indicates significance at the 5%, and 1%-levels, respectively. The Sargan-test of 
overidentifying restrictions is a test of the validity of the instruments under the null that the instruments are valid.  
 
 2SLS regressions 
 Dependent variable: 
 
First stage 




log(firm Q)t-1  
Second stage  
Investment ratet 
Explanatory variable: (1) (2) (3) (4) 
Euro country  x post-euro dummy 0.099* -0.012* 0.078 -0.010 
 [0.050] [0.006]  [0.046] [0.006] 
Log(firm Q)t-1 (instrumented)  0.128**   0.154** 
  [0.035]   [0.033] 
Cash flow/assetst-1 0.366** 0.131**  0.370** 0.122** 
 [0.111] [0.021]  [0.108] [0.020] 
Cash/assetst-1 0.295** 0.228** 0.302** 0.219** 
 [0.074] [0.021]  [0.073] [0.021] 
Leveraget-1 -0.069 -0.120**  -0.066 -0.118** 
 [0.053] [0.015]  [0.053] [0.015] 
Log(sales)t-1 0.005 -0.028** 0.007 -0.028** 
 [0.017] [0.003]  [0.017] [0.003] 
GDP growtht-1 3.131** 0.228  3.231** 0.158 
 [1.170] [0.203]  [1.073] [0.203] 
Log(GDP/capita)t-1 -0.368 0.074  -0.459 0.074 
 [0.388] [0.054]  [0.257] [0.054] 
Relative change in domestic/USD -0.233* 0.075**  -0.287** 0.082** 
exchange ratet-1 [0.109] [0.025]  [0.100] [0.025] 
Absolute change in log(firm Q)t-1    0.204**   0.205**  
(instrument) [0.040]   [0.039]  
Absolute change in log(industry Q)t-1 -0.041   -0.038  
(instrument) [0.025]   [0.024]  
Change in short-term interest ratet    2.640* -0.477 
    [1.280] [0.318] 
Change in term-spreadt    0.063 -0.108 
    [2.026] [0.376] 
Short-term interest ratet-1     -2.524  
(instrument)   [1.393]  
Term-spreadt-1   -3.050  
(instrument)   [2.566]  
Year dummies and fixed firm-effects YES YES YES YES 
Adjusted R2 excluding fixed firm effects 0.137 0.147 0.144 0.139 
Number of observations 11,208 11,208 11,208 11,208 
P-value from Sargan-test   0.438  0.246 
 
Table 4. The introduction of the euro and corporate investments: Strong vs. weak euro countries 
The sample is a balanced panel of 1401 firms from the Euro-countries (except Greece) and five Non-euro countries (Denmark, 
Norway, Sweden, Switzerland, and UK) with complete data in Worldscope over the time period 1995-2002. Estimation by 2SLS. 
The euro-countries classified as weak (i.e., countries with a recent currency crisis) are: Finland, Italy, Ireland, Portugal and Spain. 
The post-euro time period is defined as the years 1999-2002. See Appendix A for other variable definitions. Standard errors are 
reported within brackets. * and **, indicates significance at the 5%, and 1%-levels, respectively. The Sargan-test of 
overidentifying restrictions is a test of the validity of the instruments under the null that the instruments are valid.  
 
 2SLS regressions  
 Dependent variable: 
 
First stage 




log(firm Q)t-1  
Second stage  
Investment ratet 
Explanatory variable: (1) (2) (3) (4) 
Strong euro country  x post-euro dummy 0.068 -0.017** 0.058 -0.014* 
 [0.045] [0.005] [0.051] [0.006] 
Weak euro country  x post-euro dummy 0.173** 0.001 0.131** 0.007 
 [0.046] [0.009] [0.045] [0.009] 
Log(firm Q)t-1 (instrumented)  0.126**  0.131** 
  [0.036]  [0.035] 
Cash flow/assetst-1 0.369** 0.132** 0.370** 0.130** 
 [0.111] [0.021] [0.108] [0.021] 
Cash/assetst-1 0.294** 0.228** 0.298** 0.226** 
 [0.075] [0.021] [0.075] [0.021] 
Leveraget-1 -0.062 -0.119** -0.063 -0.118** 
 [0.051] [0.014] [0.052] [0.014] 
Log(sales)t-1 0.005 -0.028** 0.006 -0.028** 
 [0.017] [0.003] [0.017] [0.003] 
GDP growtht-1 3.446** 0.285 3.487** 0.280 
 [1.008] [0.211] [1.144] [0.210] 
Log(GDP/capita)t-1 -0.677* 0.020 -0.627* 0.005 
 [0.340] [0.062] [0.318] [0.061] 
Relative change in domestic/USD -0.239* 0.074** -0.253** 0.073** 
exchange ratet-1 [0.108] [0.025] [0.088] [0.025] 
Absolute change in log(firm Q)t-1    0.203**  0.205**  
(instrument) [0.038]  [0.039]  
Absolute change in log(industry Q)t-1 -0.038  -0.037  
(instrument) [0.023]  [0.023]  
Change in short-term interest ratet    2.773* -0.625* 
    [1.328] [0.318] 
Change in term-spreadt    0.367 -0.350 
    [2.010] [0.383] 
Short-term interest ratet-1    -1.329  
(instrument)   [1.993]  
Term-spreadt-1   -2.108  
(instrument)   [2.641]  
Year dummies and fixed firm-effects YES YES YES YES 
Adjusted R2 excluding fixed firm effects 0.142 0.148 0.147 0.145 
Number of observations 11,208 11,208 11,208 11,208 
P-value from Sargan-test   0.381  0.414 
P-value from F-test:  









Table 5. The introduction of the euro, firm size, and corporate investments 
The sample is a balanced panel of 1401 firms from the Euro-countries (except Greece) and five Non-euro countries (Denmark, 
Norway, Sweden, Switzerland, and UK) with complete data in Worldscope over the time period 1995-2002. Estimation by 2SLS. 
The euro-countries classified as weak (i.e., countries with a recent currency crisis) are: Finland, Italy, Ireland, Portugal and Spain. 
The post-euro time period is defined as the years 1999-2002. A firm is classified as large if its sales are above the median sales 
within its country in 1997, otherwise it is classified as small. See Appendix A for other variable definitions. Standard errors are 
reported within brackets. * and **, indicates significance at the 5%, and 1%-levels, respectively. The Sargan-test of 
overidentifying restrictions is a test of the validity of the instruments under the null that the instruments are valid.  
 
 2SLS regressions  
 Dependent variable: 
 
First stage 




log(firm Q)t-1  
Second stage  
Investment ratet 
Explanatory variable: (1) (2) (3) (4) 
Strong euro country  x small firm x 0.062 -0.019** 0.052 -0.017* 
post-euro dummy [0.042] [0.007] [0.049] [0.007] 
Strong euro country  x large firm x 0.074 -0.015* 0.064 -0.012 
post-euro dummy [0.051] [0.007] [0.055] [0.007] 
Weak euro country  x small firm x 0.186** -0.001 0.145** 0.005 
post-euro dummy [0.047] [0.011] [0.047] [0.011] 
Weak euro country  x large firm x 0.158** 0.002 0.116* 0.008 
post-euro dummy [0.048] [0.011] [0.047] [0.011] 
Small firm x post-euro dummy -0.045** 0.006 -0.045** 0.006 
 [0.008] [0.006] [0.008] [0.006] 
Log(firm Q)t-1 (instrumented)  0.126**  0.131** 
  [0.036]  [0.035] 
Absolute changes in log(firm Q)t-1 and 
log(industry Q)t-1 as instruments 
YES  YES  
Change in short-term interest ratet  and  
change in term-spreadt  as controls 
NO NO YES YES 
Short-term interest ratet-1 and term- 
spreadt- 1 as instruments 
NO  YES  
Firm- and country-specific controls YES YES YES YES 
Year dummies and fixed firm effects YES YES YES YES 
Adjusted R2 excluding fixed firm effects 0.145 0.148 0.147 0.148 
Number of observations 11,208 11,208 11,208 11,208 
P-value from Sargan-test   0.378  0.410 
P-value from F-test:      
Strong euro x small firm vs.  
strong euro x big firm 
0.562 0.608 0.567 0.611 
Weak euro x small firm vs.  
weak euro x big firm 
0.296 0.814 0.286 0.802 
Strong euro x small firm vs.  
weak euro x small firm 
0.001 0.084 0.164 0.047 
Strong euro x big firm vs.  
weak euro x big firm 
0.021 0.099 0.416 0.055 
 
Table 6. The introduction of the euro, exchange rate exposure, and corporate investments 
The sample is a balanced panel of 1341 firms from the Euro-countries (except Greece) and five Non-euro countries (Denmark, 
Norway, Sweden, Switzerland, and UK) with complete data in Worldscope over the time period 1995-2002. Estimation by 2SLS. 
The euro-countries classified as weak (i.e., countries with a recent currency crisis) are: Finland, Italy, Ireland, Portugal and Spain. 
The post-euro time period is defined as the years 1999-2002. The euro exchange rate exposure is measured as the exchange rate 
beta from a two-factor model of stock returns in which changes in the (synthetic) euro exchange rate and the domestic stock 
market return are the two factors. The estimations of exchange rate betas (ERBs) are performed using monthly data over the time 
period January 1992 to December 1994. A significant positive (negative) ERB implies that the firm benefits (is hurt) when the 
firm’s domestic currency depreciates relative to the synthetic euro. A firm is classified as having a significant (positive or 
negative) ERB if it is significant at the 5%-level according to a one-sided t-test. See Appendix A for other variable definitions. 
Standard errors are reported within brackets. * and **, indicates significance at the 5%, and 1%-levels, respectively. The Sargan-
test of overidentifying restrictions is a test of the validity of the instruments under the null that the instruments are valid. 
 
 2SLS regressions  
 Dependent variable: 
 
First stage 




log[firm Q]t-1  
Second stage  
Investment ratet 
Explanatory variable: (1) (2) (3) (4) 
Strong euro country  x post-euro dummy 0.064 -0.018** 0.053 -0.015* 
 [0.045] [0.006] [0.051] [0.006] 
Strong euro country x sign. positive ERB x -0.061** 0.003 -0.060** 0.004 
post-euro dummy [0.012] [0.014] [0.012] [0.014] 
Strong euro country x sign. negative ERB x 0.046* -0.004 0.047* -0.005 
post-euro dummy [0.019] [0.017] [0.019] [0.017] 
Weak euro country x post-euro dummy  0.165** 0.001 0.125** 0.007 
 [0.043] [0.010] [0.045] [0.009] 
Weak euro country x sign. positive ERB x -0.012 -0.012 -0.013 -0.012 
post-euro dummy [0.022] [0.025] [0.022] [0.025] 
Weak euro country x sign. negative ERB x 0.052* -0.011 0.055** -0.012 
post-euro dummy [0.022] [0.017] [0.021] [0.017] 
Log[firm Q]t-1 (instrumented)  0.135**  0.139** 
  [0.034]  [0.034] 
Absolute changes in log[firm Q]t-1 and 
log[industry Q]t-1 as instruments 
YES  YES  
Change in short-term interest ratet  and  
change in term-spreadt  as controls 
NO NO YES YES 
Short-term interest ratet-1 and term- spreadt- 
1 as instruments 
NO  YES  
Firm- and country-specific controls YES YES YES YES 
Year dummies and fixed firm effects YES YES YES YES 
Adjusted R2 excluding fixed firm effects 0.144 0.138 0.146 0.140 
Number of observations 10,722 10,722 10,722 10,722 
P-value from Sargan-test   0.299  0.396 
P-value from F-test:      
Strong euro x significant positive ERB vs. 
strong euro x significant negative ERB 
0.000 0.715 0.000 0.692 
Weak euro x significant positive ERB vs. 
weak euro x negative ERB 
0.007 0.964 0.001 0.995 
Strong euro x significant positive ERB vs. 
weak euro x significant positive ERB 
0.062 0.592 0.074 0.593 
Strong euro x significant negative ERB vs.
weak euro x negative ERB 
0.835 0.784 0.748 0.772 
 
Table 7. The introduction of the euro, financial constraints, and corporate investments 
The sample is a balanced panel of 1401 firms from the Euro-countries (except Greece) and five Non-euro countries (Denmark, 
Norway, Sweden, Switzerland, and UK) with complete data in Worldscope over the time period 1995-2002. Estimation by 2SLS. 
The euro-countries classified as weak (i.e., countries with a recent currency crisis) are: Finland, Italy, Ireland, Portugal and Spain. 
The post-euro time period is defined as the years 1999-2002. We calculate an index of financial constraints based on Kaplan and 
Zingales (1997). In particular, we use the following formula to compute a KZ-index of financial constraints: KZit = -1.002 
Cashflow /Assetsit  -39.368  Dividends /Assetsit  -1.315 Cash /Assetsit  + 0.283 Firm Qit + 3.139 Leverageit. A firm is classified as 
constrained if its KZ-index is above the median KZ-index within its country in 1997, otherwise it is classified as unconstrained. 
See Appendix A for other variable definitions. Standard errors are reported within brackets. * and **, indicates significance at the 
5%, and 1%-levels, respectively. The Sargan-test of overidentifying restrictions is a test of the validity of the instruments under 
the null that the instruments are valid.  
 
 2SLS regressions  
 Dependent variable: 
 
First stage 




log(firm Q)t-1  
Second stage  
Investment ratet 
Explanatory variable: (1) (2) (3) (4) 
Strong euro country  x constrained firm 0.044 -0.005 0.035 -0.002 
x post-euro dummy [0.032] [0.007] [0.043] [0.007] 
Strong euro country  x unconstrained firm 0.090 -0.030** 0.081 -0.027** 
x post-euro dummy [0.062] [0.007] [0.065] [0.007] 
Weak euro country  x constrained firm  0.124** 0.019 0.082* 0.025* 
x post-euro dummy [0.038] [0.010] [0.038] [0.010] 
Weak euro country  x unconstrained firm  0.221** -0.018 0.179** -0.012 
x post-euro dummy [0.064] [0.012] [0.063] [0.012] 
Constrained firm x post-euro dummy 0.054 -0.039** 0.054 -0.040** 
 [0.035] [0.006] [0.035] [0.006] 
Log(firm Q)t-1 (instrumented)  0.128**  0.132** 
  [0.036]  [0.035] 
Absolute changes in log(firm Q)t-1 and 
log(industry Q)t-1 as instruments 
YES  YES  
Change in short-term interest ratet  and  
change in term-spreadt  as controls 
NO NO YES YES 
Short-term interest ratet-1 and term- 
spreadt- 1 as instruments 
NO  YES  
Firm- and country-specific controls YES YES YES YES 
Year dummies and fixed firm effects YES YES YES YES 
Adjusted R2 excluding fixed firm effects 0.144 0.152 0.147 0.151 
Number of observations 11,208 11,208 11,208 11,208 
P-value from Sargan-test   0.390  0.401 
P-value from F-test:      
Strong euro x constrained firm vs.  
strong euro x unconstrained firm 
0.270 0.009 0.273 0.008 
Weak euro x constrained firm vs.  
weak euro x unconstrained firm 
0.066 0.006 0.066 0.005 
Strong euro x constrained firm vs.  
weak euro x constrained firm 
0.052 0.022 0.476 0.010 
Strong euro x unconstrained firm vs.  
weak euro x unconstrained firm 
0.001 0.283 0.151 0.184 
  
 
Table 8. The introduction of the euro, financial constraints, public debt issues, and corporate investments 
The sample is a balanced panel of 1401 firms from the Euro-countries (except Greece) and five Non-euro countries (Denmark, 
Norway, Sweden, Switzerland, and UK) with complete data in Worldscope over the time period 1995-2002. Estimation by 2SLS. 
The euro-countries classified as weak (i.e., countries with a recent currency crisis) are: Finland, Italy, Ireland, Portugal and Spain. 
The post-euro time period is defined as the years 1999-2002. We calculate an index of financial constraints based on Kaplan and 
Zingales (1997). In particular, we use the following formula to compute a KZ-index of financial constraints: KZit = -1.002 
Cashflow /Assetsit  -39.368  Dividends /Assetsit  -1.315 Cash /Assetsit  + 0.283 Firm Qit + 3.139 Leverageit. A firm is classified as 
constrained if its KZ-index is above the median KZ-index within its country in 1997, otherwise it is classified as unconstrained. 
See Appendix A for other variable definitions. Standard errors are reported within brackets. * and **, indicates significance at the 
5%, and 1%-levels, respectively. The Sargan-test of overidentifying restrictions is a test of the validity of the instruments under 
the null that the instruments are valid. 
 
Panel A: The effect of bond issues 
 2SLS regressions  
 Dependent variable: 
 
First stage 




log(firm Q)t-1  
Second stage  
Investment ratet 
Explanatory variable: (1) (2) (3) (4) 
Strong euro country  x constrained firm 0.044 -0.005 0.034 -0.003 
x post-euro dummy [0.032] [0.007] [0.043] [0.007] 
Strong euro country  x unconstrained firm 0.090 -0.029** 0.081 -0.027** 
x post-euro dummy [0.062] [0.007] [0.065] [0.007] 
Weak euro country  x constrained firm  0.123** 0.019 0.080* 0.024* 
x post-euro dummy [0.038] [0.010] [0.038] [0.010] 
Weak euro country  x unconstrained firm  0.221** -0.017 0.180** -0.012 
x post-euro dummy [0.064] [0.012] [0.063] [0.012] 
Constrained firm x post-euro dummy 0.054 -0.039** 0.054 -0.039** 
 [0.035] [0.006] [0.035] [0.006] 
Public debt issue dummy  0.034 0.023** 0.035 0.023** 
 [0.021] [0.008] [0.020] [0.008] 
Log(firm Q)t-1 (instrumented)  0.126**  0.131** 
  [0.036]  [0.035] 
Absolute changes in log(firm Q)t-1 and 
log(industry Q)t-1 as instruments 
YES  YES  
Change in short-term interest ratet  and  
change in term-spreadt  as controls 
NO NO YES YES 
Short-term interest ratet-1 and term- 
spreadt- 1 as instruments 
NO  YES  
Firm- and country-specific controls YES YES YES YES 
Year dummies and fixed firm effects YES YES YES YES 
Adjusted R2 excluding fixed firm effects 0.144 0.153 0.146 0.148 
Number of observations 11,208 11,208 11,208 11,208 
P-value from Sargan-test   0.397  0.385 
P-value from F-test:      
Strong euro x constrained firm vs.  
strong euro x unconstrained firm 
0.258 0.010 0.260 0.011 
Weak euro x constrained firm vs.  
weak euro x unconstrained firm 
0.061 0.007 0.062 0.008 
Strong euro x constrained firm vs.  
weak euro x constrained firm 
0.051 0.022 0.486 0.019 
Strong euro x unconstrained firm vs.  
weak euro x unconstrained firm 
0.001 0.269 0.168 0.233 
 
Panel B: Interaction between bond issues and financial constraints 
 2SLS regressions  
 Dependent variable: 
 
First stage 




log(firm Q)t-1  
Second stage  
Investment ratet 
Explanatory variable: (1) (2) (3) (4) 
Strong euro country  x constrained firm 0.033 -0.007 0.024 -0.004 
x post-euro dummy [0.029] [0.007] [0.041] [0.007] 
Strong euro country  x unconstrained firm 0.091 -0.029** 0.081 -0.027** 
x post-euro dummy [0.063] [0.007] [0.065] [0.008] 
Weak euro country  x constrained firm  0.118** 0.020 0.077* 0.025* 
x post-euro dummy [0.038] [0.010] [0.038] [0.010] 
Weak euro country  x unconstrained firm  0.222** -0.017 0.180** -0.012 
x post-euro dummy [0.064] [0.012] [0.063] [0.012] 
Constrained firm x post-euro dummy 0.056 -0.037** 0.056 -0.038** 
 [0.037] [0.006] [0.037] [0.006] 
Public debt issue dummy  0.015 0.035** 0.018 0.035** 
 [0.019] [0.010] [0.018] [0.010] 
Public debt issue x strong euro country   0.224** 0.057* 0.225** 0.056 
x constrained firm x post-euro dummy [0.080] [0.029] [0.080] [0.029] 
Public debt issue x weak euro country   0.139 0.004 0.137 0.003 
x constrained firm x post-euro dummy [0.096] [0.035] [0.095] [0.035] 
Public debt issue  x constrained firm  -0.087 -0.059* -0.090 -0.058* 
x post-euro dummy [0.081] [0.023] [0.079] [0.023] 
Log(firm Q)t-1 (instrumented)  0.125**  0.130** 
  [0.036]  [0.035] 
Absolute changes in log(firm Q)t-1 and 
log(industry Q)t-1 as instruments 
YES  YES  
Change in short-term interest ratet  and  
change in term-spreadt  as controls 
NO NO YES YES 
Short-term interest ratet-1 and term- 
spreadt- 1 as instruments 
NO  YES  
Firm- and country-specific controls YES YES YES YES 
Year dummies and fixed firm effects YES YES YES YES 
Adjusted R2 excluding fixed firm effects 0.146 0.154 0.150 0.153 
Number of observations 11,208 11,208 11,208 11,208 
P-value from Sargan-test   0.387  0.351 
 
Table 9. The introduction of the euro and corporate investments: Anticipation effects 
The sample is a balanced panel of 1401 firms from the Euro-countries (except Greece) and five Non-euro countries (Denmark, 
Norway, Sweden, Switzerland, and UK) with complete data in Worldscope over the time period 1995-2002. Estimation by 2SLS. 
The euro-countries classified as weak (i.e., countries with a recent currency crisis) are: Finland, Italy, Ireland, Portugal and Spain. 
To test for anticipation effects of the introduction of the euro, we interact dummies indicating whether a firm belongs to a strong 
or weak euro country with two time-period dummies; (i) a dummy indicating if the time period is 1998 and later, and (ii) a 
dummy indicating the time period is 1999 and after.  See Appendix A for other variable definitions. Standard errors are reported 
within brackets. * and **, indicates significance at the 5%, and 1%-levels, respectively. The Sargan-test of overidentifying 
restrictions is a test of the validity of the instruments under the null that the instruments are valid. 
 
 2SLS regressions  
 Dependent variable: 
 
First stage 




log(firm Q)t-1  
Second stage  
Investment ratet 
Explanatory variable: (1) (2) (3) (4) 
Strong euro country  x 1998 and later  -0.050 0.001 -0.065 0.003 
time period dummy [0.028] [0.008] [0.035] [0.008] 
Strong euro country  x 1999 and later  0.104* -0.018* 0.100 -0.016 
time period dummy [0.046] [0.008] [0.059] [0.009] 
Weak euro country  x 1998 and later  0.024 0.004 0.023 0.003 
time period dummy [0.028] [0.011] [0.077] [0.012] 
Weak euro country  x 1999 and later  0.158** -0.002 0.119* 0.005 
time period dummy [0.050] [0.012] [0.054] [0.012] 
Log(firm Q)t-1 (instrumented)  0.126**  0.128** 
  [0.036]  [0.035] 
Absolute changes in log(firm Q)t-1 and 
log(industry Q)t-1 as instruments 
YES  YES  
Change in short-term interest ratet  and  
change in term-spreadt  as controls 
NO NO YES YES 
Short-term interest ratet-1 and term- 
spreadt- 1 as instruments 
NO  YES  
Firm- and country-specific controls YES YES YES YES 
Year dummies and fixed firm effects YES YES YES YES 
Adjusted R2 excluding fixed firm effects 0.143 0.148 0.148 0.147 
Number of observations 11,208 11,208 11,208 11,208 
P-value from F-test:      
[Strong euro x 1998 and later + Strong 
euro x 1999 and later] = 0 
0.230 0.004 0.450 0.025 
[Weak euro x 1998 and later + Weak 
euro x 1999 and later] = 0 
0.000 0.847 0.020 0.419 
P-value from Sargan-test   0.384  0.364 
Table 10. The introduction of the euro and corporate investments: Industry effects 
The sample is a balanced panel of 1401 firms from the Euro-countries (except Greece) and five Non-euro countries (Denmark, 
Norway, Sweden, Switzerland, and UK) with complete data in Worldscope over the time period 1995-2002. Estimation by 2SLS. 
The euro-countries classified as weak (i.e., countries with a recent currency crisis) are: Finland, Italy, Ireland, Portugal and Spain. 
The post-euro time period is defined as the years 1999-2002. The industry classification is based on two-digit SIC codes 
(manufacturing industry = SIC codes 20-39; trade industry = SIC codes 50-59; services industry = SIC codes 70-89; 
transportation, communications, and utilities industry = SIC codes 40-49; basic industry = SIC codes 1-19). See Appendix A for 
other variable definitions. Standard errors are reported within brackets. * and **, indicates significance at the 5%, and 1%-levels, 
respectively. The Sargan-test of overidentifying restrictions is a test of the validity of the instruments under the null that the 
instruments are valid. 
 
 2SLS regressions  
 Dependent variable: 
 
First stage 




log(firm Q)t-1  
Second stage  
Investment ratet 
Explanatory variable: (1) (2) (3) (4) 
Strong euro country  x manufacturing x 0.055 -0.004 0.045 -0.001 
post-euro dummy [0.060] [0.007] [0.063] [0.007] 
Strong euro country  x  trade x 0.072 -0.032** 0.058 -0.029* 
post-euro dummy [0.061] [0.012] [0.064] [0.012] 
Strong euro country  x services x 0.134 -0.046** 0.118 -0.042** 
post-euro dummy [0.096] [0.016] [0.097] [0.016] 
Strong euro country x communications,  0.143** -0.068** 0.131** -0.066** 
transportation, and utilities  x post-euro 
dummy 
[0.031] [0.016] [0.047] [0.016] 
Strong euro country  x basic industry x 0.051 -0.010 0.039 -0.007 
post-euro dummy [0.056] [0.017] [0.055] [0.017] 
Weak euro country  x manufacturing  0.152* 0.006 0.114* 0.011 
industry x post-euro dummy [0.062] [0.011] [0.055] [0.010] 
Weak euro country  x  trade industry x 0.092* -0.031 0.053 -0.024 
post-euro dummy [0.043] [0.020] [0.042] [0.020] 
Weak euro country  x services industry x 0.365** 0.022 0.323** 0.028 
post-euro dummy [0.103] [0.027] [0.101] [0.027] 
Weak euro country  x communications, 0.259** -0.011 0.219** -0.006 
transportation, and utilities  x post-euro 
dummy 
[0.050] [0.021] [0.057] [0.021] 
Weak euro country x basic industry x 0.205** -0.003 0.160* 0.004 
post-euro dummy [0.059] [0.020] [0.067] [0.020] 
Log(firm Q)t-1 (instrumented)  0.122**  0.125*** 
  [0.037]  [0.036] 
Interactions between industry dummies 
and  post-euro dummy 
YES YES YES YES 
Absolute changes in log(firm Q)t-1 and 
log(industry Q)t-1 as instruments 
YES  YES  
Change in short-term interest ratet  and  
change in term-spreadt  as controls 
NO NO YES YES 
Short-term interest ratet-1 and term- 
spreadt- 1 as instruments 
NO  YES  
Firm- and country-specific controls YES YES YES YES 
Year dummies and fixed firm effects YES YES YES YES 
Adjusted R2 excluding fixed firm effects 0.151 0.153 0.155 0.153 
Number of observations 11,208 11,208 11,208 11,208 
P-value from Sargan-test   0.107  0.204 
Table 11. The introduction of the euro and corporate investments: Robustness to excluding big countries 
In Panel A the sample is a balanced panel of 583 firms from the Euro-countries (except Greece, France and Germany) and four 
Non-euro countries (Denmark, Norway, Sweden, and Switzerland) with complete data in Worldscope over the time period 1995-
2002. In Panel B the sample is a balanced panel of 1,027 firms from the Euro-countries (except Greece, France and Germany) 
and five Non-euro countries (Denmark, Norway, Sweden, Switzerland, and UK) with complete data in Worldscope over the time 
period 1995-2002. Estimation by 2SLS. The euro-countries classified as weak (i.e., countries with a recent currency crisis) are: 
Finland, Italy, Ireland, Portugal and Spain. The post-euro time period is defined as the years 1999-2002. See Appendix A for 
other variable definitions. Standard errors are reported within brackets. * and **, indicates significance at the 5%, and 1%-levels, 
respectively. The Sargan-test of overidentifying restrictions is a test of the validity of the instruments under the null that the 
instruments are valid. 
 
Panel A: Excluding UK, France and Germany 
 2SLS regressions  
 Dependent variable: 
 
First stage 




log(firm Q)t-1  
Second stage  
Investment ratet 
Explanatory variable: (1) (2) (3) (4) 
Strong euro country  x post-euro dummy -0.005 -0.005 -0.003 -0.006 
 [0.038] [0.008] [0.035] [0.009] 
Weak euro country  x post-euro dummy 0.093* 0.008 0.061 0.007 
 [0.043] [0.009] [0.038] [0.010] 
Log(firm Q)t-1 (instrumented)  0.133**  0.159** 
  [0.047]  [0.046] 
Cash flow/assetst-1 0.222 0.150** 0.219 0.146** 
 [0.164] [0.027] [0.162] [0.027] 
Cash/assetst-1 0.268** 0.253** 0.267** 0.246** 
 [0.079] [0.031] [0.077] [0.031] 
Leveraget-1 -0.123 -0.134** -0.134* -0.129** 
 [0.064] [0.023] [0.068] [0.023] 
Log(sales)t-1 0.042 -0.040** 0.042 -0.041** 
 [0.024] [0.005] [0.024] [0.005] 
GDP growtht-1 3.122** 0.287 2.718** 0.204 
 [0.665] [0.244] [0.638] [0.243] 
Log(GDP/capita)t-1 -0.876** 0.014 -0.720** 0.033 
 [0.107] [0.077] [0.142] [0.076] 
Relative change in domestic/ USD/  0.332* 0.162** 0.227* 0.171** 
exchange ratet-1 [0.158] [0.052] [0.109] [0.053] 
Absolute change in log(firm Q)t-1    0.260**  0.257**  
(instrument) [0.065]  [0.067]  
Absolute change in log(industry Q)t-1 -0.077*  -0.074*  
(instrument) [0.037]  [0.038]  
Change in short-term interest ratet     0.646 -0.530 
   [1.640] [0.400] 
Change in term-spreadt     2.167 -0.397 
   [3.183] [0.537] 
Short-term interest ratet-1    -0.064  
(instrument)   [1.036]  
Term-spreadt-1   2.818  
(instrument)   [3.042]  
Year dummies and fixed firm-effects YES YES YES YES 
Adjusted R2 excluding fixed firm effects 0.192 0.153 0.196 0.144 
Number of observations 4,664 4,664 4,664 4,664 
P-value from Sargan-test   0.299  0.379 
P-value from F-test:  










Table 11 (continued) 
 
Panel B: Excluding France and Germany only 
 2SLS regressions  
 Dependent variable: 
 
First stage 




log(firm Q)t-1  
Second stage  
Investment ratet 
Explanatory variable: (1) (2) (3) (4) 
Strong euro country  x post-euro dummy 0.077* -0.012 0.054 -0.009 
 [0.037] [0.008] [0.034] [0.008] 
Weak euro country  x post-euro dummy 0.187** 0.003 0.136** 0.008 
 [0.042] [0.011] [0.043] [0.010] 
Log(firm Q)t-1 (instrumented)  0.130**  0.119** 
  [0.024]  [0.042] 
Cash flow/assetst-1 0.355** 0.248** 0.357** 0.129** 
 [0.130] [0.026] [0.128] [0.024] 
Cash/assetst-1 0.339** -0.120** 0.349** 0.246** 
 [0.058] [0.018] [0.057] [0.026] 
Leveraget-1 -0.060 -0.033** -0.061 -0.119** 
 [0.061] [0.004] [0.064] [0.018] 
Log(sales)t-1 0.005 0.195 0.007 -0.033** 
 [0.020] [0.228] [0.020] [0.004] 
GDP growtht-1 2.860** 0.009 2.267** 0.214 
 [0.880] [0.080] [0.843] [0.225] 
Log(GDP/capita)t-1 -1.008** 0.099** -0.830** -0.003 
 [0.259] [0.029] [0.245] [0.077] 
Relative change in domestic/ USD  -0.218* -0.012 -0.234* 0.096** 
exchange ratet-1 [0.097] [0.008] [0.098] [0.029] 
Absolute change in log(firm Q)t-1    0.192**  0.194**  
(instrument) [0.035]  [0.036]  
Absolute change in log(industry Q)t-1 -0.037  -0.035  
(instrument) [0.025]  [0.025]  
Change in short-term interest ratet     2.944* -0.545 
   [1.172] [0.372] 
Change in term-spreadt     1.907 -0.262 
   [2.658] [0.423] 
Short-term interest ratet-1    -0.059  
(instrument)   [1.427]  
Term-spreadt-1   1.546  
(instrument)   [1.718]  
Year dummies and fixed firm-effects YES YES YES YES 
Adjusted R2 excluding fixed firm effects 0.192 0.160 0.166 0.160 
Number of observations 8,216 8,216 8,216 8,216 
P-value from Sargan-test   0.504  0.409 
P-value from F-test:  
Strong euro vs. weak euro firms 
 
0.000 
 
0.162 
 
0.085 
 
0.108 
 
